République Démocratique du Congo: appel de Lausanne pour une Conférence Nationale Souveraine

 

 

 

Appel de Lausanne pour l’organisation d’une Conférence Nationale Souveraine en République Démocratique du Congo

 

Appel pour l’organisation d’une Conférence Nationale Souveraine en République Démocratique du Congo

 

L’espoir déçu

 

Après un long règne sans partage de 32 ans, Mobutu Sese Seko vieillissant et malade fut écarté de la tête de la République au profit de Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Saigné à blanc, le pays n’était plus qu’une coquille vide aux plans économique et social. Venue de l’Est et soutenue par les Anglo-Saxons, la rébellion s’avérera être en réalité une agression du Rwanda et de l’Ouganda et court-circuitera les institutions issues de la Conférence Nationale Souveraine, lesquelles institutions préparaient le pays à une démocratie pluraliste.

Les Congolais étaient partagés entre stupeur et espoir. La stupeur d’une partie de la population était de voir balayés tous les efforts consentis par une opposition et une société civile qui avaient travaillé durement pour arracher des droits que la dictature bien enracinée de Mobutu avait longtemps refusés au peuple congolais. Espoir et soulagement pour d’autres parce que malgré tout, le président Mobutu et son entourage proche s’étaient évertués depuis trop longtemps à faire obstruction aux institutions issues de la Conférence Nationale Souveraine et à les empêcher de fonctionner normalement. L’espoir fut donc de courte durée.

 

Un long tunnel

 

En août 1998, la lune de miel entre Laurent-Désiré Kabila et ses parrains africains et occidentaux avait pris l’eau. S’ouvrait alors pour le pays, une longue période d’instabilité généralisée suite à des attaques répétées des armées du Rwanda et de l’Ouganda, mais aussi des groupes qualifiés de rebelles fabriqués par les deux pays susmentionnés, pour se venger de la « trahison » de leur poulain.

En janvier 2001, le président Laurent-Désiré Kabila fut assassiné dans des conditions restées mystérieuses jusqu’à aujourd’hui. C’est dans ce contexte que Joseph Kabila est arrivé à la tête de la RDC, selon un procédé douteux et anti-démocratique dans un pays non-monarchique.

 

Un pays ingouvernable

 

Ingouvernable, avec l’aide des institutions internationales, le pays a tenté différentes formules, même les plus farfelues (1 président et 4 vice-présidents). Les élections de 2006 conféraient à Monsieur Joseph Kabila une légitimité contestée par la majorité des observateurs nationaux et internationaux face à Jean-Pierre Bemba. La paix, priorité des priorités, prônée par le gouvernement, n’est jamais revenue en RDC. Au contraire, un bilan négatif très lourd peut être constaté, puisqu’à ce jour, on dénombre plus de 6 millions de morts congolais, selon Human Rights Watch (HRW), plus de 2 millions de femmes violées déclarées et plus de 2 millions de déplacés, sans compter le pillage systématique des ressources minières du pays par des milices et des armées régulières du Rwanda, du Burundi et de l’Ouganda. L’Etat a failli dans bien d’autres domaines comme la santé, l’éducation, l’agriculture, le transport, l’économie, l’énergie, l’eau, etc. Excédé, le peuple allait sanctionner le pouvoir dans les urnes. C’est ainsi que les élections présidentielles de 2011 consacraient la victoire d’Etienne Tshisekedi. Mais contre toute attente, ne voulant pas quitter le pouvoir, Monsieur Joseph Kabila choisit de rester aux commandes du pays par défi. Depuis, la crise de légitimité issue de ces élections paralyse les institutions du pays faute de confiance entre le peuple et le pouvoir.

 

La violence politique comme mode de gouvernance en RDC

 

Comme dans toutes les situations historiques d’illégitimité, en RDC la violence politique est devenue le seul moyen sûr de se maintenir au pouvoir. Les opposants vivent dans l’angoisse d’être arrêtés et certains d’entre eux, enlevés nuitamment par des escadrons du pouvoir, disparaissent sans laisser de traces. On note plusieurs cas d’assassinat des acteurs de la société civile et des emprisonnements arbitraires pour délit d’opinion. Les manifestations publiques sont violemment réprimées. À cet égard, 421 corps ont été découverts dans un charnier à Maluku, en périphérie de Kinshasa. Tout porte à croire que ce sont des étudiants tués lors des manifestations publiques des 19, 20 et 21 janvier 2015 et enterrés à la hâte sans égard pour la dignité humaine. Cette culture de violence politique ne s’embarrasse pas de principes éthiques qui devraient animer tout détenteur de la puissance de l’Etat. C’est dans ce seul domaine que le pouvoir de Kinshasa se découvre une efficacité redoutable. Car, tous les indicateurs économiques et sociaux classent la RDC parmi les derniers au monde. Cela est d’autant plus choquant, quand on sait que le pays possède des ressources et donc des potentialités énormes qui feraient de lui un pays prospère et un partenaire intéressant pour beaucoup d’autres pays en Afrique et dans le monde.

 

Pour une voie de sortie de crise

 

Dans ce contexte, il nous apparaît que le pouvoir de Kinshasa a complètement perdu toute crédibilité et ne peut être l’organisateur des élections de 2016. Aussi, pour éviter plus de souffrances au peuple congolais qui a déjà marqué son net rejet de ce régime et ne se contentera plus de jouer que le rôle de voter mais pas celui d’élire ses dirigeants, il devient urgent de convoquer des assises sous la forme d’une Conférence Nationale Souveraine (CNS). Ces assises de tous les espoirs devront constituer une véritable chance, une catharsis pour le peuple congolais dont les souffrances remontent à plusieurs décennies. Le but d’une telle Conférence devra être à la hauteur du drame que vit le peuple congolais depuis trop longtemps. La CNS devra s’ouvrir sur des perspectives plus larges et plus lointaines que des échéances électoralistes politiciennes à court terme. Il s’agit de rassembler le peuple congolais autour de principaux sujets d’intérêt national afin de tracer clairement l’avenir de la nation.

 

La tenue d’élections pluralistes, libres, crédibles, démocratiques et transparentes est certes un objectif, mais elle doit être la résultante d’une meilleure gouvernance, apaisée, compétente, humaine et respectueuse des droits et des libertés du peuple congolais. L’histoire nous enseigne que les élections n’ont pas épargné au peuple congolais toutes sortes d’affres et de tragédies. La recherche de la stabilité, de la sécurité, de l’harmonie et de la concorde nationales doit primer dans un pays qui ne pratique pas la transparence, dévasté et lacéré comme la RD Congo.

Les conclusions de la CNS devront être opposables à tous sans exception et leur application sans faille devra être accompagnée par une autorité ad hoc de suivi indépendante, dotée de pouvoirs réels. Nous appelons toutes les forces de changement et toutes les personnes éprises de paix et de bonne volonté à se joindre au Collectif d’initiative pour ce noble objectif. C’est la voie qui, à nos yeux, est la mieux indiquée pour désincarcérer le peuple congolais de l’étau d’un pouvoir de terreur et abusif qui confisque son destin depuis plus de 14 ans.

 

Que ceux qui coupent les fleurs ne deviennent les maîtres du printemps

 

Pour paraphraser Pablo Neruda, en RDC, la Communauté internationale ne doit pas permettre que ceux qui s’acharnent à couper les fleurs deviennent les maîtres du printemps. Au XXIe siècle, il est inacceptable d’abandonner tout un peuple à la merci des caprices d’un homme voire des hommes en arme ou d’un régime. L’éveil des consciences est tel qu’aujourd’hui, même en Afrique, il n’y a plus un seul peuple qui se résignerait à subir la violence politique de manière durable, sans que cela ne provoque une confrontation aux conséquences incalculables et une violence encore plus fulgurante et plus incontrôlable. Car, comme l’a si bien dit John Fitzgerald Kennedy, à vouloir étouffer les révolutions pacifiques, on rend inévitables les révolutions violentes. L’heure est grave et l’urgence d’organiser une Conférence Nationale Souveraine s’impose pour sortir la République Démocratique du Congo de l’impasse.

 

Pour le Collectif d’initiative :

 

Roger Buangi PUATI, théologien et pasteur au sein l’Eglise Protestante du Canton de Vaud en Suisse, diplômé d’Etudes commerciales, spécialiste et conférencier sur l’histoire de la traite négrière, auteur de Christianisme et traite des Noirs (éditions Saint-Augustin, 2007), a enseigné à l’Ecole d’Etudes Sociales et Pédagogiques de Lausanne, professeur à l’Université Populaire Africaine de Genève et président de l’association « Congo Solidaire ».

 

Jeanne-Marie Sindani, Politologue et Economiste, Chercheure spécialisée en matière de relations internationales; engagée dans la défense des droits humains et protection de la femme Congolaise; membre élue du Comité Exécutif de la CSU-Fuerstenfeldbruck Chargée de l‘intégration des immigrés ; Vice-présidente de l’Union des Femmes (Frauen-Union) de la CSU Circonscription de Fuerstenfeldbruck en Bavière, Présidente de l’Union des Patriotes de la Diaspora Congolaise (UPDC e.V.), basée en RFA.

 

Docteur en Sciences Économiques et Sociales (mention : Science Politique) et diplômé en pédagogie appliquée, Fweley Diangitukwa a enseigné au département de Science Politique de l’Université de Genève, à l’Université Omar Bongo à Libreville au Gabon et à l’Université panafricaine à Yaoundé au Cameroun. Initiateur de Muanda Business School (MBS), il est l’auteur de nombreux ouvrages et de plusieurs articles publiés dans des revues scientifiques.

Understanding the geopolitical play behind the fall in oil prices

 Oil has reached a 4-year low, with the barrel of Brent now under 80 USD for the first time since 2011. The fall was been very sharp, considering the Brent was above 115 USD per barrel as late as June 2014.

Analysts have been puzzled as market dynamics do not fully explain this downward trend.

Observers have been quick to point out that US shale oil has been flooding the market, while global demand has softened. However neither of these trends can fully explain the sharp drop in oil prices. Regional and global political consideration are driving the market, with Saudi Arabia playing the pivotal role.

Brent crude oil futures in USD/barrel in 2014 (as of 14th November, 2014)

 

Market dynamics

Over the summer, analysts have pointed to China as a cause for oil price declines, as the country’s economic growth slows gradually. At the same time, weak US manufacturing data has also helped overshadow the fact that the price decline is as much due to the policy of OPEC producer countries as it is due to lower demand levels.

During past oil price drops, Saudi Arabia was able to offset part of the drop by decreasing domestic production, thereby reducing available oil supply. Saudi Arabia has effectively been the oil market regulator for the past decades and has often sought to work contra-cycle in order to ease the economic impact of tight oil markets for Western consumer nations, and first and foremost its US ally.

According to Marco Dunand, Mercuria’s CEO, OPEC would need to remove 1.5m barrels a day from the market for prices to stabilize and recover. But Saudi Arabia currently has a vested interest in keeping oil prices low as this adversely impacts the profitability of numerous projects across the globe, particularly capital intensive extraction processes such as shale oil, ultra-deep off-shore and small field developments.

In other words, Saudi Arabia has found a way of creating a barrier to entry which protects its market share and long-term economic sustainability.

Beating off the shale gas competition

 

Saudi Arabia now accounts for less than 700,000 barrels of oil imports to the US. This means that not only is Saudi Arabia at risk of losing one of its historical markets (as has happened to Nigerian crude) but it risks becoming less relevant to its key ally if the US were no longer to depend on Saudi oil.

In an article for the FT, Abdalla El-Badri, secretary-general of Opec, said he expected a reduction in higher cost oil production such as US shale if Brent remained around $85 a barrel. According to analysts this translates to a price of $65-$75 at the wellhead in the Bakken, the region driving the US shale oil revolution.

“With the exception of Wood Mackenzie, who see more efficient drilling methods taking Bakken break-even rates down to $58 and a price of $70 at the wellhead shutting down only 150,000 barrels per day, most observers of the shale oil scene see $80/$85 Brent as a red alert level,” said oil broker David Hufton of PVM, also quoted in the FT piece.

On November 5th, newly published Saudi oil prices for December indicated that US customers would also start benefiting from price discounts, setting off a wave of concern across the US shale investor community.

This sparked Saudi Oil Minister Ali Al-Naimi to deny any intentions of an oil price war. However, he has travelled to Mexico and Venezuela since the price discounts were announced, a move viewed as a way of appeasing tensions with other major producing countries that depend on oil revenue for public budgets.

The geopolitical matrix

The drop in oil prices has been masterminded by Saudi Arabia, together with several of the world’s largest oil consumers.

By keeping oil prices depressed, Saudi Arabia hurts the income of countries such as Iran and Russia, both of which are actively supporting the Assad regime in Syria. Saudi Arabia and most Arab states support this policy as they see it as a way of wearing down Shia ardor.

Assad’s supporters are feeling the pinch.

The fall in rubble, following market sanctions due to Russia’s engagement in the Ukrainian conflict, compounded by the drop in oil prices, is hitting Russia’s revenue very hard. The narrowing trade surplus has naturally been the first indicator to show this trend.

Speaking at the G20 Summit in Brisbane, Vladimir Putin has stated that Russia is prepared for a catastrophic collapse of oil prices, despite the fact that oil and gas production and exports account for 50% of the State’s revenue and 68% of Russia’s total export revenues according to the US Energy Information Agency. Oil and gas exports in 2013 amounted to 355 billion USD.

Putin said Russia’s economy had the reserves to withstand a collapse in oil revenues, but added: “We are considering all the scenarios including the so-called catastrophic fall of prices for energy resources which is entirely possible and we admit it.”

On November 12th, market reports indicated that Russia has been massively buying gold bullion, an indication of the country’s wish to offset the lower trade surplus and thus protect the value of the rubble.

While Western media have been relatively silent on the issue, Russian media have been quick to highlight the drop in prices as a new type of oil war waged by the US and its allies.

Similarly Middle Eastern news outlets have focused on how Saudi Arabia is letting oil prices slide to settle disputes with Iran.

Iran has been less vocal that Russia in recent weeks but has also suffered mightily from the drop in market prices. Bloomberg reported on 30th October that oil revenue was down 30%. This comes as Iran needs to achieve a break-even sales price of $143 a barrel this year to maintain its fiscal balance, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. In other words, international sanctions around the country’s nuclear programme and falling oil prices will lead to deficits and an adverse impact on the country’s GDP following two years of negative growth.

Saudi Arabia’s decision to give China big oil price discounts hurts Iran badly as China is the country’s main buyer of crude.  The battle for regional supremacy in the Gulf is also being played out on the oil markets, and Saudi Arabia seems to have the upper hand.

Besides Russia and Iran, the obvious losers are producing countries, such as Nigeria and Mexico, as their income is set to shrink markedly.

At the same time consumer countries have been supportive of this trend. In fact official documents show that Saudi Arabia has been offering oil at discount prices at some of its major customers, including China, India, and since November, the US, causing the WTI oil price index to drop sharply on November 4th.

Western nations also benefit from lower oil prices, as do most developing countries. Egypt for example despite its producer status is a net importer and the decrease in international prices means that households enjoy a drop in gasoline prices, which is welcome in a tense political and social situation.

The outlook

The fall in oil prices is expected to stabilize around the 80 USD mark, although some analysts expect the barrel to drop even lower, this time responding to declining demand and additional supplies coming to world markets through the projected Keystone XL pipeline bringing Canadian oil to the Gulf of Mexico.

The IEA’s latest Oil Market Report expects the price fall to continue well into 2015. »It is increasingly clear that we have begun a new chapter in the history of the oil markets, » the IEA said, adding that « barring any new supply problems, downward price pressures could build further in the first half of 2015.”

Saudi officials also hold that view…and they are the market makers.

There is an underlying risk to European and Asian consumer nations, however. Long-term, they could become further dependent on a small number of suppliers and investors could struggle to finance the massive investments needed to sustain the projected rise of oil production to over 100 million barrels by 2040, driven mainly by developing nations.

All eyes are now riveted to the next OPEC meeting which will be taking place in Vienna on November 27th. Will OPEC cut back from its current production of 31 million oil per day? All depends on what Saudi Arabia believes is the right price level to achieve its geopolitical goals.

Author biography

Thomas Esdaile-Bouquet is an international energy affairs expert, having worked on sustainable energy, oil and gas and climate policies and markets for the past 10 years.

An alumni of both the Strasbourg and Bordeaux Institutes for Political Sciences, Thomas has held positions in Washington, Paris, Brussels, London and Geneva, advising consultancies, industry trade associations, UN agencies, ministries and multinationals.  He is currently based in Switzerland.

This piece is written in his personal capacity and the views reflected are his own.

Follow Thomas on Twitter: @tomesdaile

Turkish energy dependency a major factor in regional power play

  • Turkey is dependent on oil and natural gas imports to fuel the country’s economic growth
  • Turkey has scored major success with string of energy agreements with the KRG
  • Turkey, led by Recep Erdogan, is now mired in a complex and volatile situation at its borders
  • Initial improvements in relations with Turkey’s Kurdish minority now in question
  • Currently benefiting from both low oil market prices and cheap clandestine imports from ISIS-held Syrian oil fields but energy partnership is a “gas play” for Ankara.

INTRODUCTION

Recep Erdogan, Turkey’s President, and Ahmet Davutoglu, who recently became Turkey’s prime minister after serving for years as foreign minister, have been playing an astute game since 2012, despite having to break away from their “zero problems with neighbors” policy.

Ankara has safeguarded Turkey’s economic growth potential by securing long-term energy supplies from Iraqi Kurdistan while offering Turkish Kurds the prospects of a normalization in relations.

The importance of the energy deals with the KRG must also be seen in light of Turkey’s large account deficit. Turkey really felt the pinch in 2013 when oil prices surged above 115 USD per barrel. The rise in oil prices in August 2013 alone imposed an additional financial burden of around $300 million on Turkey.

The recent plight of Syrian Kurds on Turkey’s very doorstep, however, has thrown a more cynical light on Recep Erdogan’s regional strategy. Ankara is now playing a cautious game on three fronts:

  • Securing domestic stability in light of Turkish Kurdish emotions and Islamist extremists on its own territory
  • Safeguarding Turkey’s growth prospects thanks to energy agreements with the KRG
  • Maintaining territorial integrity despite calls for a break-up of Syria

THE CREATION OF A NEW REGIONAL ENERGY NEXUS

 

Turkey’s thirst for energy

A Booming economy reliant on foreign energy

Since 2005, the Turkish economy has growth from 392.2 Billion USD to a projected 820.21 billion USD in 2014, despite the marked dip in 2009 following the US subprime crisis.

After experiencing years of continuous economic growth, Turkey’s economy started slowing down in 2013. In 2014, the government came under intense market pressure to take action and prove sluggish 2015 growth outlooks wrong, while the large current account deficit has become a major political issue.

Electricity production

Turkey’s electricity demand grew by more than 90% from 2001 to 2011. In 2012, Turkey’s total electricity generating capacity was 56.1 GWe and total net electricity generation was 228 TWhe.

Production is split between natural gas, coal and hydro. Fossil fuel sources account for the largest share of electricity generation, with natural gas as the most important source (47%).

Due to the large number of on-site power production plants running on natural gas at industrial and commercial sites, autoproducers are important electricity market actors, with an increasing market share.

According to « Turkish Electrical Energy 10 Year Generation Capacity Projection (2010-2019) », prepared by the Turkish Electricity Transmission Corporation (TEIAS), expected yearly average demand growth rates are expected to be  between 6,5% and 7,5%. The report foresees that electricity consumption shall reach 390 TWh by 2019 in case of high demand against 367 TWh in the low demand scenario. In both cases, Turkey will be facing electricity shortage in 2016.

Turkey has been looking for diversify its electricity production mix but renewable energy generation is only starting to gain real traction. Turkey has a large wind potential and the Turkish Ministry hopes to grow a limited capacity base to 10,000 MW in 2015 and 20,000 MW in 2023, playing a major role in achieving the stated 30% renewable electricity target for 2010 set by the government.

Currently however, alternatives to natural gas power production prove more capital intensive, with investment horizons well beyond the 3 year mark required by most Turkish investors in uncertain times.

Oil

According to the US Energy Information Agency, Turkey’s total liquid fuels consumption averaged 734,800 bbl/d in 2013, with more than 90% of crude oil consumption being imported. In 2012, Iran accounted for 35% of the country’s supply.

In 2010, around 50% of Turkish total oil demand was consumed in the transport sector, while the industry sector and the commercial/agriculture/other sector accounted for 24% and 14% respectively. Relatively high oil demand in the industry sector derives from the construction and chemical sectors (33 % and 31% of industry’s share, respectively).

Crucially, the IEA expects Turkey’s crude oil imports to double over the next decade. Turkey’s economy grew by 4% over 2013, and total consumption of liquid fuels in Turkey increased by another 6% in that year.

Natural gas

While oil is an important fuel, particularly for transportation, natural gas has been powering Turkey’s economic development. The transformation sector has been the largest consumer of natural gas, representing about 48% of the country’s total gas consumption in 2011. Industrial growth will continue to spur demand for natural gas.

Turkey has struggled in recent years with seasonal demand variations. Peak demand in winter months can be twice the volumes consumed in summer months.  The main sectors driving increases in winter natural gas demand are the electricity sector and residential sector, while the gap between summer and winter peak demand is expected to widen until 2019. By the winter of 2019, peak natural gas consumption is set to top 250 mcm/d, about 90 mcm/d above today’s level.

The IEA’s 2013 Turkey update noted that Turkish gas demand significantly increased from 0.7 billion cubic meters in 1987 to 45.3 bcm in 2012, while domestic production barely reached 0.6 bcm that year.

The country relies very heavily on natural gas imports. As of 2011, Russia alone accounted for 58% of Turkey’s gas imports.

Energy infrastructure has been a major focus of government policy and Turkey has planned to diversify natural gas import pathways through constructing new major cross border pipelines and LNG terminals, on top of the country’s four existing international pipelines with a total import capacity of some 46.6 bcm.

Imports from Azerbaijan, although much better value, also remain constrained by pipeline capacity. Even when the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline comes on-stream in about 2018, it will only provide Turkey with another 6bcm in the initial phase, not much – especially given the rapid increase of domestic gas demand. Azerbaijani gas is welcome but can only ever fulfil a small fraction of Turkey’s requirements. Yıldız’s claim that TANAP will cut domestic gas prices seems therefore optimistic.

Turkey’s supply and demand position, based on Botas projections (but excluding spot LNG supplies), shows that Turkey could have a 5 Bcm annual supply deficit by 2015, despite having already renewed its LNG import with Algeria’s Sonatrach. By 2017, Turkey will need to import an additional 10 Bcm/y.

With the current natural gas supply network nearing full capacity, security of supply is already a major issue in Turkey and current policy aims at increasing natural gas storage facilities and power plants often have to be fitted with fuel switching capacity and hold sufficient amounts of secondary fuel such as diesel.

Source: Botas (in Natural Gas in the Turkish Domestic Enegry Market, Oxford Energy Research Institute, February 2014).

Looking at future trends, several contracts will be up for renewable as from 2021, as for example the 10 Bcm/y of Russian gas supplied through the Western Line to private companies.

Azerbaijan gas came at the lowest prices for natural gas, charging 349 USD/thousand cubic meter in 2013, compared to 428 USD for Russia gas and 507 USD for Iranian imports. Unfortunately for Turkey, new gas fields are only expected to come on line in Azerbaijan in 2025.

Turkey’s natural gas demand at the year 2030 was calculated as 76.8-83.8 bcm based on linear and logistic models, respectively. The most conservative scenarios (excluding nuclear power) table on demand reaching 70 Bcm/y in 2030. Household demand is expected to grow to 22.7 Bcm, up from 9 bcm/y and industry could go from 8 to 14 bcm. The main driver will be the projected 7% annual rise in electricity demand.

In this context the role KRG natural gas imports could play becomes plain to see.

Image1

The current figure of 46.6 bcm of natural gas import capacity must be compared with the projected additional import capacity from the KRG that should reach 10 bcm per year in the next few years, while Genel Energy Chairman Mehmet Sepil suggested recently that in ten years’ time tis figure could be as high as 30 bcm per year.

Needless to say, Turkey is having to balance its appetite for Iraqi Kurdish energy with the prospects of deteriorated relations with Baghdad.

Image2

 

Iraqi Kurdistan, the new hydrocarbons frontier

Iraqi Kurdistan has gone within a decade from an impoverished backwater to the attention grabbing frontier exploration and production region we know today.

While US policy has played a major role in instilling stability and bolstering the KRG’s international profile, the emergence of the Western Zagros geological region as the most active and promising new oil basin in the world has been pivotal in turning around the economy of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Money is literally pouring into the region, whether in the form of license fees, bribes, Production Sharing Contracts, capital-intensive investments in hardware and salaries.

The fast changing face of Iraqi Kurdistan

According to a paper by Azad Sadoon of Nawroz University, in 2018 nearly $108 billion of oil will be exported from the region compared to the current $10 billion per year: tenfold increase of regional income over six years.

With Kurdish oil reserves estimated at around 45 billion barrels and natural gas reserves estimated at 100 to 200 trillion cubic meters, from Erbil’s perspective, this is only the beginning of even greater things to come, as production at most fields has barely begun and the KRG output as a whole is expected to surge.

The KRG’s total production capacity is currently slightly more than 400,000 barrels per day even though analysts peg current production at 120,000 b/d. Kurdish officials say they plan to reach a production target of 2 million barrels per day by 2015, turning the Kurdistan region into a major player on the international energy map and surpassing Libya in country rankings. Not surprising when the region’s combined oil and gas reserves have been valued at 5 trillion USD.

A locked-in territory looking to evade Baghdad’s control

With the KRG at loggerheads with the central Iraqi authorities over the distribution of oil money, Erbil is well-aware that monetizing on the oil produced locally could prove problematic as exports routes are controlled by the Iraqi federal government.

In 2012, Kurdistan stopped exporting 200,000 barrels per day through Iraq’s federal pipelines and instead started trucking smaller amounts of oil to Turkey.

In keeping with its overarching aim of autonomy (some observers would suggest independence as a more truthful aim), the KRG has been intent on freeing itself of Baghdad’s dominion. This has in turn accelerated the pursuit of export routes that bypass the federal pipeline network and the search for more amenable foreign partners.

Turkey presented itself as the natural partner for the KRG. The KRG and Turkey share an extensive border and only 150 to 200 kilometers separate Turkey from Kurdistan’s oil and gas fields. Moreover, the Turkish port of Ceyhan has become an important outlet for both Caspian oil exports as well as Iraqi oil shipments from Kirkuk and is fast becoming a regional energy hub, with private investors receiving approval to build several refineries at the oil terminal.

The KRG has been intent on forging closer energy ties with their Turkish neighbor since 2012. Much of this rapprochement has been the work of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) Minister of Natural Resources, Ashti Hawrami, who understands that it is in Iraqi Kurdistan’s interest to work with Turkey in order to eventually gain access to international energy markets and thus increase energy revenue. While Hawrami spoke out about gas exports as far back as 2012, oil has been the more actively traded energy sources, while pipeline construction has been ongoing.

Kurdish oil has already been flowing to Turkey, but flows are limited due to the necessity to truck crude to its final destination, or at least to the nearest pipeline, causing logistical issues and making the tracking the destination of the region’s oil difficult, if not virtually impossible.

Given the two-tier pricing mechanism in place which provides for steep discounts for oil sold locally (in the 50 USD/b range), the KRG has long been looking to maximize revenue by getting its oil to international markets. At present, this means exporting to Turkey and beyond.

The central piece to the KRG’s plan is the so-called Kurdish Regional Government Pipeline, which is due to connect oil fields in the northeast, KRG-controlled portion of Iraq to Turkey via an independent pipeline from the Taq Taq field (which produces about 120,000 barrels of light sweet crude per day) to the Fishkhabur node of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. The KRG has completed the pipeline which has a capacity of 300,000 bbl/d, but Iraq’s government has threatened litigation against Turkey for buying KRG oil without Baghdad’s official approval.

A further heavy crude oil pipeline with capacity of 1 million barrels is also being built in the region.

Washington’s change of stance

A key ally of both Turkey and the KRG, Washington had long backed Baghdad on the issue of Kurdish oil exports to Turkey. The American position could be explained as an attempt to hold Iraq together along a federal model of governance that would allow for Kurdish autonomy without bringing the prospect of the country’s breakup.

The shift in US policy on the matter can be viewed as recognition of the de facto situation on the ground, as well as weaning American support for the Al-Maliki government in Baghdad.

As reported by TodayZaman, “following a meeting between Turkish Prime Minster Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and US President Barack Obama in May 2014 at the White House, US complaints concerning the pipeline have stopped”.

 

 

The Turkey-KRG energy deals

Throughout 2013 Erbil and Ankara worked on a number of energy deals. In November 2013 news broke that the KRG and Turkey signed agreements and contracts enabling Kurdish oil to flow to Turkey’s port of Ceyhan from which KRG oil exports began on May 23.

In order not to offend Baghdad neither party commented officially in the press at the time.

Baghdad opposed the agreement, claiming it would bypass the country’s national oil company SOMO (State Oil Marketing Company) and violate Iraq’s federal constitution. With everything in place prior to the lifting of US opposition to KRG exports to Turkey, Erbil and Ankara were quick to seize the opportunity offered by Washington and

The batch of deals -complemented by further agreements signed in June 2014- cover:

  • The construction of a second pipeline linking Kurdish oil and gas to Turkey
  • Turkish priority on oil import
  • TEC assistance in handling KRG oil
  • Gas imports of up to 20 bcm per year through a new pipeline, starting in 2017
  • Turkish interest in 13 exploration blocks, with 6 Turkish companies granted permission to explore.

While the Kirkuk-Khurmala pipeline has captured most of the media’s attention, in part due to the controversial status of Kirkuk oil exports by the KRG, as industry sources as quick to point out “It is actually a gas game”.

Turkey’s daily gas demand stood at 125 million cubic meters in late 2012 and is likely to rise to nearly 220 million during the harsh winter months, according to energy ministry officials.

How Turkey is set to benefit from its energy ties with the KRG.

Turkey imports the vast majority of its primary energy sources, in particular when it comes to oil and natural gas.

Currently however, imports from Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan amount to very little, with Turkey depending predominantly on Iran and Russia.

Under the agreement struck with the KRG, Ankara is set to benefit from prices on natural gas approximately 50% lower than those of existing supply agreements with Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan. In monetary terms, Ankara’s KRG natural gas imports will cost Turkey on average 200-250 USD for 1,000 cubic meters of natural gas, compared to about 450 USD per 1,000 cubic meters from existing suppliers.

Projecting the share and impact of KRG oil and gas imports

If we compare current energy demand and sources of supply to a forward-looking scenario in which Turkey achieves “energy integration” with the KRG, the significance of the new Turkey-KRG energy partnership becomes evident.

As of 2012/2013, i.e. before the energy deals, Turkish demand could be summarized as follows:

  • Turkey’s total liquid fuels consumption averaged 734,800 bbl/d in 2013
  • Natural gas consumption: 3 bcm (124 mcm/d) in 2012, while domestic production barely reached 0.6 bcm that year.
  • Transit: four existing international pipelines with a total import capacity of some 46.6 bcm.
  • Cost of energy imports: 60 billion USD in 2012.

Meanwhile, Turkey’s natural gas demand profile is set to turn the country into one of Europe’s largest natural gas consumer. Turkey has a number of long-term supply contracts in place and has been actively seeking additional supply partners to cover the projected shortfall in gas imports.

Russian gas is the cheapest available to Turkey, but supply constraints mean that Turkey so far has had to turn to expensive Iranian gas or to equally costly LNG imports.

In 2013 the 8 bcm of natural gas imported from the Russian Blue Stream pipeline alone were worth an estimated 3.4 billion USD.

The raft of energy agreements is set to change dramatically the outlook for KRG energy exports, with near 100% of those exports to flow to or through Turkey. The result will be that Turkey will have large volumes of available, affordable natural gas (and oil) it can import at a fraction of the price of Russian or Iranian gas.

Image3

The key aspects to bear in mind are:

  • Turkey will be able to purchase up to 20 billioncubic meters per year of Kurdish gas through a new pipeline to be built via Turkey. Imports are expected to start by early 2017 even though in the IEA central scenario for Iraq (2014) natural gas exports start around 2020 with 20 Bcm/y.
  • Genel Energy has stated that in next ten years, Northern Iraq may be providing 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year to Turkey.
  • Kirkuk-Khurmala oil pipeline with a capacity of 1 million b/d (in addition to recent 300,000 b/d KRG oil pipeline to Turkey)

Image4

Assuming an average price of 225 USD/mcm for Kurdish gas compared to an average of 450 USD/mcm for other gas (i.e. 50% of the Kurdish price) and volumes of 20 bcm/year, then Turkey can hope to save in the range of 4,5 billion USD every year on its natural gas bill alone.

With above 30 bcm of additional natural gas demand expected by 2030, the KRG is projecting itself as the primary source of natural gas to spur Turkey’s economic growth.

The cumulative total of savings Turkey can hope to achieve by importing Kurdish gas rather than Azeri, Russian or other countries lies in part to Turkey enjoying first mover advantage as well as good political ties with Erbil. The terms of the KRG supply contracts could evolve in the long run.

State-controlled companies leading the dance

In addition, Turkey has been careful to include several state-controlled Turkish companies into the agreements with the KRG.

From oil and gas operators to banking institutions, the import of Kurdish crude is allowing Turkey to continue to develop its own energy value chain.

From oil companies to financial institutions, a number of Turkish players are set to benefit from the KRG energy partnership:

  • Ankara has set up the Turkish Energy Company (TEC), a state-backed entity to enter partnership deals with Exxon and will be Turkey’s counterparty in dealings with Kurdistan.
  • A dozen Turkish companies have already applied for license imports.
  • Turkish TPEK (affiliated with BOTAS) is competing for the development of Kurdish natural gas fields, along with Turko-British company Genel Energy.
  • Turkish state pipeline company Botas will be instrumental in building the second pipeline, which will have a capacity of at least 1 million bpd ofcrude oil, a government source said. A private Turkish company is also interested in the project.
  • Despite the U.S. and Baghdad’s international pressure, as of August 2014, the KRG had managed to sell around 2 million barrels of crude oil. Payments for the tankers of Kurdish crude have reportedly been so far deposited with Turkey’s state-run Halkbank.

ERDOGAN’S RISKY REGIONAL STRATEGY

More than ever Turkey is constantly balancing risks and rewards in a volatile and fast changing region.

It is not possible to analyze Turkey’s energy supply strategy without looking at the implications of the on-going regional conflict in Syria and Iraq, along with the Kurdish question in all three countries.

Recep Erdogan has angled Turkey in such a way as to be –so far at least- the primary beneficiary of the regional chaos by both safeguarding national interest and strengthening the country’s energy supply.

Erdogan has followed a multi-stepped strategy, breaking away from past policy tenets to open up new horizons. While the initial phases have been crowned with success, the plight of the Syrian Kurdish city of Kobane, on Turkey’s doorstep, is highlighting the risks associated with Erdogan’s Great Game. International public opinion in particular has been shocked at Erdogan’s cynicism, as exemplified by numerous press articles, such as this one by The Guardian.

Not only is Turkey receiving condemnation in the world, including from its NATO ally, the United States, but its inaction has revived the deep antagonism between Turkish Kurds and the Ankara authorities, with clashes costing the lives of dozens of Turkish Kurds in early October, as reported by Amnesty International.

So how did a country go from a policy of “zero problems with our neighbors” to being mired in this decade’s worst conflict? Will Turkey go on to strengthen its position as expected, or will Erdogan’s soft spot for the Sunni jihadists backfire?

This piece aims to shed more light on this fast developing situation and its geopolitical implications for Turkey.

TURKISH KURDS

The Kurdish minority in Turkey represents 15 to 25% of the country’s total population, depending on the estimates.

Winning more of the Kurdish vote has been key to AKP victories in the latest general and presidential elections. Erdogan has been acutely aware that a first round victory in the 2014 presidential elections would require shoring up support amongst Turkey’s Kurds.

Ankara has favoured gigantic hydro and agricultural projects deep in Kurdish territory, close to the Iraqi border.

At the same time, Kurds have been ramping up pressure on Erdogan to further their own agenda. In May, the Chairman of the Human Rights Association indicated that in the past two years an estimated 2 to 3,000 young Kurds had joined PKK training camps.

Since 1984, the PKK has engaged in armed insurgency, targeting Turkish authorities, the military and energy infrastructure.

As Dr. Gönül Tol, the founding director of The Middle East Institute’s Center for Turkish Studies underlined in a piece for CNN, “the success of the Turkey-KRG energy partnership hinges on the peaceful resolution of Turkey’s Kurdish problem.”

Turkey’s strategic gas and oil pipeline system has often been attacked by PKK fighters and this in turn has meant having to buy Russian or Azeri gas at higher prices.

Erdogan’s coup de maître was to engage with the PKK’s imprisoned leader and pave the way for the watershed cease-fire agreement announced by imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan on 21st March 2013. At the time, Ankara seemed to actively seek a long-term normalization of relations with Turkey’s large Kurdish minority.

The immediate result was the declaration by PKK commander Murat Karayilan of the withdrawal of PKK fighters stationed in Turkey.

Ankara is having to offer real advances to the country’s Kurds, while at the same time appeasing Turkish nationalists that are increasingly active since the start of the Syrian conflict.

In September 2013, a reform package was unveiled allowing  the use of the Kurdish language in election campaigns, lifting restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language in private schools, abolishing the “I am a Turk” pledge of allegiance for schoolchildren and allowing Kurdish towns to use their Kurdish names.

For the Kurds, however, this was barely acceptable and the PKK warned that it may end the unilateral ceasefire. Public education in Kurdish, and the lowering of the 10 percent electoral threshold for political parties to enter Parliament remain key demands.

Unfortunately for Turkey, the government’s attitude concerning Kobane has only widened the rift between parties and Ankara is on the verge of losing the little support it had gained among Kurds since 2012. Tensions are now rife in Turkish Kurdistan, as the vocal Hüda Par Turkish political party, marked by Islamic fundamentalism and a certain proximity with ISIS, has members fighting alongside ISIS, further inflaming Kurdish opinion.

KRG

The transformation in Turkey’s approach to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) over the past six years or so has been remarkable. From a refusal to formally engage with Erbil and even threats to invade over perceived independence aspirations, Turkey now enjoys what leaders on both sides sometimes refer to as a ‘strategic’ relationship with the KRG and is seeking for further “economic integration”. Over half of Turkey’s considerable trade with Iraq is with the KRG and thousands of Turks reside there, with over half of the foreign companies present in the region being Turkish. In 2013, trade between the KRG and Turkey was estimated at 12 billion USD, with reports that this could double if trading conditions were improved.

KRG and Peshmerga leaders have many business ties with Turkey and have long perceived the PKK as a brake on further cross-border trade. The presence of PKK training centers and safe havens in the Khandil mountains in KRG territory has long been a thorn in relations until the Turkish AKP governing party started engaging in a political dialogue, rather than military operations. Ankara believes that greater economic ties will reduce the PKK’s funding which largely originates in smuggling goods.

Pitting the KRG against the Iraqi central government, Erdogan struck an oil import deal with the Kurdish Regional Government. This deal and rapprochement was made all the more easy since the KRG has adopted a very liberal approach under Mr Barzani, in stark contrast to the prevailing ideology amongst the PKK and amongst parts of Syria’s Kurdish minority.

Kurdistan is historically a clan-based society. Turkey knows that it risks losing the KRG’s trust if it allows ISIS to conquer any significant territory in Iraqi Kurdistan. The powerful Barzani clan is from the region of Dohuk, which has come within striking distance of ISIS troops in North Western Iraq but also borders Turkey, with many clan members on Turkey’s side of the border.

The disruptions in Eastern Iraq, combined with Baghdad’s refusal to release oil revenue and the ISIS threat to Kurdish territory has put the KRG in a weakened position and ever more reliant on Turkey as a trading partner and source of finance. If anything, the crisis has reinforced the case for closer cooperation.

IRAQ

Erdogan’s government has been paying lip service to Baghdad while promoting its own interests in the region.

Erdogan’s Turkey and Al-Maliki’s Iraq have grown more and more estranged as Iraq has turned increasingly towards Iran while a number of issues and decisions have pushed both leaders apart. Fundamentally, Erdogan has long criticized Iraqi Shia “sectarianism”.

Turkey is well aware of the outstanding issues between the KRG and the Iraqi government around the payment of oil revenues and decision-making in the Iraqi oil and gas sector. Turkey managed to overcome Baghdad main resistance when it included as part of the deal with the KRG the construction of a metering station and plans for independent auditing of oil flows from the KRG and of the management of the oil revenue from the new 1 million b/d pipeline.

At the same time, Turkey has sought to leverage its ties with the US to put pressure on the Baghdad government authorities to accept the energy deal with the KRG.

Ankara’s agreement with the KRG has elicited muted public reactions from Baghdad. Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Hussain al-Shahristani has welcomed recent agreements between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish administration on oil and natural gas exports to Turkey, but was quick to add that the central government in Baghdad should not marginalized in any such agreements. Behind closed doors however, Sunni and Shia Iraqi politicians are left fuming at Erbil’s and Ankara’s decision to go it alone.

In the long-run however, with Iraqi oil production expected to climb to about 6,5 million b/d by 2035, Turkey has an interest to appease Baghdad and both countries are destined to become strong trading partners.

SYRIA

Despite its original policy of “zero problems with our neighbors”, in Syria, Turkey has chosen to support Sunni rebels in their fight against El-Assad. At the same time, Ankara has continued to withhold direct support to Syrian Kurds, in part due to the fact the Turkish government suspects the Assad regime of supporting the PKK.

Betting on Sunni insurgents to defeat Al-Assad / Ankara’s Syrian bet

Erdogan’s timid resolve to confront ISIS in Syria is in part due to the presence of an estimated 1000 Turkish nationals amongst ISIS ranks who could come back and engage in terrorist activities on Turkish soil.

ISIS has proven a magnet for new jihadists across Turkey, a reality that Ankara is have to juggle with.

At the same time, Ankara is wary of acting against ISIS as the jihadi group holds 49 Turkish diplomats captive since it conquered Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, in June.

From the beginning of the conflict, Turkey pursued an “open-door policy” toward Syrians, and carried out successful humanitarian assistance to refugees in its camps. Turkey is appreciated for this policy and the conditions of the camps. A report published in April by the International Crisis Group described them as the “best refugee camps ever seen.”

Turkey has to deal with the 1.5 million Syrians that have sought refuge in the country, of which 200,000 from Kobane. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has already come out stressing that Turkey had spent $4.5 billion on Syrian refugees. Some 900,000 Syrians are registered and living in refugee camps across Turkey, while those outside camps are spread out across the country. The overwhelming majority are concentrated in five provinces adjacent to Syria: Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa and Mardin.

Why Erdogan mistrusts Syrian Kurds

Besides the obvious Kurdish independence fears expressed by Ankara, another, less mentioned, aspect helps explain Turkey’s reticence to allow PKK support to the Kurdish resistance factions (YPG and the PYD, the PKK’s Syrian offshoot and ally).

Syrian Turks describe their uprising in 2012 as the Rojava revolution, based on the name of the Syrian province of Rojava.

As reported by Guardian journalist David Graeber, The situation in Rojava province is in many ways reminiscent of the plight of Spanish republicans in 1936, with the wider world unaware that a democratic experiment is under threat of being stamped into the ground by ISIS.

Kobane is in fact the epicenter of the Rojava Revolution, which explains why to Syrian Kurds the fate of Kobane surpasses the strategic importance of the city’s geography and why they have appealed to Turkish Kurds to join them in defending the city.

While the Kurdish populations around Aleppo in North Western Syria and those in Eastern Syria are under the aegis of the Kurdish PYD, the city of Kobane is first and foremost been protected by the YPG

The Rojava Revolution is defined by self-governance along a participatory, decentralized model, very far from any form of centralized government structure. It borrows largely on the YPG’s political textbook.

Turkey opposes these groups not only ideologically (liberalism vs Marxism) but also politically (centralized state vs decentralized participatory democracy).

Erdogan has so far overseen a risky game of divide and conquer, instrumentalising its strategic geographical position and bouncing various factions (such as the Free Syrian Army, the PKK, the YPG and the KRG) against each other, creating a confusing landscape for many observers and indeed for Syrian Kurds themselves.

Ergogan would like the peshmerga – who are fierce enemies of the PKK – to become the vanguard against ISIS and thus undermine the PYD/PKK alliance.

If anything, Kobane is now rather left to its own devices, until Erdogan or Barzani (the only 2 regional players with political clout backed by operational troops) decide to achieve reputational gains.

As the Asia Times Online Editor-in-Chief puts it in his “The Kobani riddle” article dated 24th October, the barbarians, in the form of Islamic State goons, are at the gates of Kobani, the (…) epicenter of a non-violent experiment in local democracy. But don’t expect the US, Turkey and the administration of Iraqi Kurdistan to save Kobani (…). None of these actors want the direct democracy experiment in Kobani and Rojava to bloom, expand and start to be noticed all across the Global South.”

Turkey is bent on ensuring the permanency of the current regional borders and fears above all a resurgence of Kurdish national aspirations, which could potentially lead to a redrawing of Turkey’s eastern borders.

Therefore it is in Turkey’s interest to displace Kurdish populations currently living in Northern Syria along the Turkish border. The further East the Kurds resettle in Syria, the lower the risk to Turkish borders. Eventually, a much reduced Syrian Kurdistan could only seek to (a) remain as a part of a federal Syria or (b) breakaway to join the KRG, thereby redrawing the boundaries of Iraq and Syria. At this stage, both these options appear as distant possibilities at best.

Syria in the regional energy equation

As a result of the turmoil and ISIS capture of the country’s main oil fields and despite Syria’s drop in production, more discounted oil is reaching Turkey than ever before. It is estimated that as of January 2014, Syria’s total daily oil production had fallen from 300,000 b/d down to 25,000 b/d.

Depending on sources, ISIS now makes a profit estimated at between 1 million USD and 2 million USD every day from oil taken from the Rumeilan region in Eastern Syria, where 2,000 wells and refineries have fallen under ISIS’s sway. The largest Syrian field, the El-Oman has been under ISIS control since June and ISIS continues to this day to attack the remaining oil and gas assets in Syria.

This has often resulted in direct armed confrontation against Jabhat al-Nusra and Kurdish YPG protection units in Rojava, each group vying for control over the revenues from the sale of petroleum products to Turkey, in particular the stretch between the districts of Cizre in Sirnak province and Nusaybin in Mardin province.

The crude, often stolen directly at refineries, is exported mainly to Turkey, but also to Jordan and Iraqi Kurdistan at discounted prices, with reports of jihadists making a little over 20 USD per barrel. Turkish and Kurdish authorities have rebuked these claims. Nevertheless, a Turkish official from the border region of Hatay claimed in June that as much as 800 million USD worth of oil has already been smuggled into Turkey.  Turkish newspapers reported that “the daily amount of smuggled diesel fuel (from Syria) had reached 1,500 tons, which corresponds to 3.5% of Turkey’s consumption.”

Smuggling of various qualities of oil and petroleum products is now done through pipes from villages near the Turkish border at Hatay but also Kilis, Urfa and Gaziantep, after which they enter the international oil circuits.

This new source of cheap oil has added to the drop in global oil prices.

Saudi Arabia has taken the lead in a bid from Sunni Arab countries to flood the market with cheap oil as a way of punishing Russia for its support to Damascus and in order to stave investments away from shale and ultra-deep plays that could capture increasing market share. Reuters has reported on 13th October that Saudi officials have hinted at prices in the 80-90 USD per barrel for the next year or two.

Ultimately, those benefiting have been the consumer nations worldwide and, first and foremost amongst these, Turkey.

CONCLUSION

So far then Turkey has managed to maintain its position within suffering no more than limited domestic unrest and international criticism. Still, the PKK ceasefire still holds, relations with the KRG leadership remain excellent, the Syrian Kurdish “Rojava Revolution” is a fast diminishing political alternative, which reduces the likelihood of having to redraw the country’s southern border and Turkey is enjoying greater flows of low cost imported oil from its immediate neighbors.

While we are nowhere near the end of the Iraqi-Syrian conflict, and Turkey has had to recalibrate its foreign policy several times since 2012, but Erdogan has so far played his own version of the Great Game to great success, despite the perils.

Moving forward, one can expect Turkey to continue to cherish its partnership with the KRG. Ankara will do everything it can to secure its slice of Kurdistan’s economic miracle.

Author biography

Thomas Esdaile-Bouquet is an international energy affairs expert, having worked on sustainable energy, oil and gas and climate policies and markets for the past 10 years.

An alumni of both the Strasbourg and Bordeaux Institutes for Political Sciences, Thomas has held positions in Washington, Paris, Brussels, London and Geneva, advising consultancies, industry trade associations, UN agencies, ministries and multinationals.  He is currently based in Switzerland.

This piece is written in his personal capacity and the views reflected are his own.

Follow Thomas on Twitter: @tomesdaile

Moyen-Orient, Irak et Kurdistan iraquien : état des lieux et évolution, par Frédéric Guinot

Ce texte est issu d’une présentation faite au Département fédéral des Affaires Etrangères à Berne en 2012 lors d’un colloque sur le Printemps arabe et ses conséquences. Frédéric Guinot est ingénieur, ayant acquis une grande expérience dans le secteur pétrolier. Il est entre autres fondateur de la section suisse de la Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE).

Le Moyen-Orient (Asie antérieure) demeure l’acteur incontournable de l’approvisionnement en pétrole

Dans sa l’édition 2012 de la “Statistical Review”, BP nous offre un graphique (Fig. 1) représentant l’évolution géographique des réserves mondiales de pétrole prouvées entre 1991 et 2011, qui fait apparaître une augmentation globale de celles-ci. Les réserves additionnelles sont dues à de nouvelles découvertes telles qu’en mer profonde, voire très profonde, à la meilleure connaissance des gisements existants pour lesquels les volumes ont pu être revus à la hausse, mais aussi à l’augmentation des prix du pétrole (Fig. 2) qui permet de rendre économique l’exploitation de ressources qui ne l’étaient pas il y a dix ou vingt ans. La notion de réserves est en effet intimement liée au prix du baril de brut dans la mesure où seules les quantités économiquement exploitables y sont comptabilisées. L’évolution des techniques mais aussi des prix autorisant la mise en œuvre de techniques plus onéreuses participent de l’addition de nouvelles réserves d’hydrocarbures.

Figure1

La BP statistical review montre en particulier un saut dans les réserves canadiennes entre 1991 et 2001 (de 41 à 180 milliards de barils), puis dans les réserves du Venezuela, passant de 77 à 296 milliard de barils dans la décennie suivante. Ces nouvelles réserves reflètent l’inclusion dans leurs chiffres des sables bitumineux du Canada puis des bruts lourds de l’Orénoque pour le Venezuela. Par ce jeu, l’importance relative du Moyen-Orient dans les ressources pétrolières mondiale se trouve diminuée, crédité de 64% des réserves mondiales en 1991, sa part n’est plus que de 48% en 2011.

Figure2

Méfions-nous cependant d’une interprétation trop rapide de ces chiffres. Toutes les énergies ne se valent pas, et tous les pétroles ne se valent pas. En effet, l’extraction pétrolière est elle-même consommatrice d’énergie, et l’importance pétrolière de ces grandes régions n’a de sens que par leur capacité à fournir de l’énergie à la fois pour leur développement ainsi qu’au reste du monde. Il convient donc de considérer la valeur énergétiques des bruts lourds et bitumineux au regard de l’énergie nécessaire à leur extraction. Les énergéticiens utilisent le rapport de l’énergie récupérée sur l’énergie injectée « Energy returned on energy invested (EROEI) » afin de classer la valeur des différentes ressources énergétiques (fig. 3). On constate alors que le brut du Moyen-Orient offre un rapport EROEI d’environ 30 alors que celui des bitumes et des bruts lourds est dix fois moindre. Ken Chew, spécialiste des questions énergétiques chez IHS envisageait même lors d’une conférence à Genève la construction par les canadiens de centrales nucléaires destinées à fournir la vapeur nécessaire à l’exploitation des sables bitumineux. Si de tels projets devaient être mis en œuvre, il s’agirait surtout d’utiliser des hydrocarbures comme une façon de stocker l’énergie nucléaire et de la rendre transportable, plutôt que d’exploiter de nouvelles ressources pétrolières. La cohérence de ce type d’exploitation d’un point de vue purement énergétique reste à démontrer, sans même en étudier les aspects environnementaux. Cet évènement, faut-il le préciser, était antérieur à la catastrophe de Fukushima. Si on reprend la répartition des réserves pétrolières mondiales, et qu’on les traduit en réserves énergétiques pétrolières, c’est à dire en y incorporant le facteur EROEI le Moyen-Orient reprend alors toute sa place, ne laissant aucun doute sur le rôle primordial qu’il continuera à jouer dans les décennies qui viennent.

Figure3

La deuxième figure de la BP Statistical Review que nous souhaitons commenter représente en deux graphiques montrés en parallèle l’évolution depuis 1986 des productions et consommations de pétrole par grandes régions (Fig. 4). En commençant par le graphique de droite (consommation) on remarque que la consommation des pays développés a été relativement stable et a même décru ces dernières années sous les effets combinés d’une démographie maitrisée, de la mise en œuvre de technologies énergétiquement plus sobres puis de la crise économique. En revanche, la région Asie-Pacifique, tirant la croissance mondiale avec son industrialisation à marche forcée et sa démographie encore dynamique se présente comme responsable de la quasi-totalité de l’accroissement de la demande pétrolière.

Figure4

Si on se réfère à présent au graphique de gauche (production), on constate que la quasi-totalité de cette demande supplémentaire a été pourvue par l’accroissement de production au Moyen-Orient, tandis que la montée en puissance de la production africaine compensait le déclin des exploitations nord-américaines. Notons que le Moyen-Orient a réussi à doubler sa production au cours de cette période, alors qu’il était le théâtre de conflits majeurs. La « force de frappe pétrolière » d’un Moyen-Orient apaisé et organisé serait hégémonique.

L’Irak en hausse, l’Iran en baisse

En reprenant les chiffres ici encore présentés par BP et reproduits graphiquement figure 5, l’Arabie Saoudite domine sans surprise la région en matière de réserves pétrolières. En deuxième position vient l’Iran, au coude à coude avec l’Irak, suivi du Koweït et des Emirats Arabes Unis.

figure 6

Il convient de considérer ces chiffres avec prudence. En effet, les pays du Moyen-Orient de sont pas soumis aux audits de réserves et le montant de celles-ci ne sont connues qu’au travers de ce qu’ils consentent à déclarer. Les hydrocarbures constituent pour ces pays une très large part des recettes de l’Etat, ils sont contrôlés par des sociétés nationales, et dans le cadre des accords de l’OPEP, ces valeurs font l’objet d’enjeux stratégiques cruciaux, en particulier sous forme d’attribution de quotas de production. Enfin, dans certains pays de la région, la connaissance et le contrôle de ces réserves peuvent faire l’objet de rivalités politiques internes. Malgré tout, les réserves importantes de l’Irak et sa population relativement faible (33 millions) en font un acteur pétrolier mondial de première importance.

Le Business Monitor International (BMI) nous renseigne sur l’évolution récente de la production pétrolière au Moyen-Orient (Fig. 6). L’Irak a peu à peu reconstitué son outil de production pour retrouver les niveaux qu’on lui connaissait à la fin des années 80, avant la première guerre du Golfe. Sous l’effet de sanctions de plus en plus sévères, la production iranienne chute depuis 2010. Ces sanctions dissuadent un certain nombre de clients potentiels de s’approvisionner en Iran, même s’il reste un gros travail à effectuer pour rallier la chine et l’Inde à ce boycott.  En prévenant des pièces détachées et les technologies les plus avancées de pénétrer en Iran, ce pays voit son outil de production se dégrader, tout comme ses outils de transport et de raffinage, l’Iran devant importer des produits raffinés, en particulier des carburants.  En 2010, Téhéran importait 78.000 des 400.000 barils d’essence consommés par jour dans le pays. Si l’on croit en croit les projections présentées par l’agence internationale de l’énergie (AIE) et le BMI (Fig. 7), la tendance devrait se poursuivre dans la décennie qui vient ; l’Irakaccroîtrait sa production journalière, passant de 2,7 à 8 millions de barils par jour tandis que l’Iran verrait dans le même temps sa production chuter de 10% passant d’un peu plus de 4,2 à 3,8 millions de barils par jour. Quant à l’Arabie Saoudite, en augmentant sa production de 10% et bien que se maintenant en tête des pays producteurs, elle verrait son importance relative diminuer dans la région. L’Irak possède donc à moyen terme l’ambition de devenir le solide deuxième producteur de pétrole du Moyen-Orient en distançant durablement son rival iranien.  Les récents développements politiques en Iran et la volonté d’ouverture affichée par le nouveau président pourrait cependant redorer la pâleur de l’industrie iranienne à moyen terme.

figure7

Quelle(s) Stratégie(s) pour les ambitions irakiennes ?

Les ambitions affichées de l’Irak vont au-delà des chiffres pronostiqués par l’AIE. En Octobre 2012, M. Shahristani, ministre iraquien du pétrole, a déclaré que son pays produirait entre 9 et 10 millions de barils par jour en 2020. Si on ajoute les projets de croissance de productions décrites par les autorités de Bagdad et les ambitions affichées par les autorités de la région autonome du Kurdistan (KRG) on obtient l’évolution décrite figure 8.

figure8

Tous les gros gisements connus se situent dans la partie sud de l’Irak, entièrement contrôlée par le gouvernement fédéral. On notera qu’il en est de même pour le gisement de Kirkuk, située à la limite du Kurdistan, et évidemment revendiqué par les deux parties. Le peuplement de la zone de Kirkuk est d’ailleurs actuellement un enjeu majeur entre Kurdes et Arabes, Bagdad et le KRG tentant d’asseoir leurs revendications territoriales  – et économiques – sur des bases ethniques. Si les ambitions de Bagdad sont impressionnantes en matière de développement de leur outil de production, que dire de celle du KRG ? La figure 9 mets en perspective les croissances de production respectivement envisagées par les deux parties.  Tandis que le sud irakien produit aujourd’hui plus de 2,5 millions de barils par jour des champs géants des régions allant de Kirkuk à Bassora, le Kurdistan irakien ne produit en moyenne qu’environ 250.000 barils par jour, les deux plus gros contributeurs étant les gisements de Taq Taq et de Tawke.

figure9

On peut imaginer que des plans de développement rondement menés sur des réserves connues peuvent tripler la production du sud de l’Irak dans des temps relativement courts. En revanche, pour décupler sa production dans la décennie qui vient, le KRG a besoin de découvrir de nouveaux gisements, puis de les développer. Il doit donc entreprendre sans attendre des campagnes d’exploration de son sous-sol. On est donc en présence de deux stratégies différentes, l’une de développement industrielle, l’autre d’exploration pétrolière à grande échelle dont les nécessités singulières respectives braquent les décideurs politiques. Développer des réserves prouvées, même si les investissements sont conséquents, représente une activité peu risquée pour les entreprises pétrolières. Sur cette base, et tout en désirant conserver la propriété entière de leurs ressources naturelles, Bagdad a offert aux grandes entreprises internationales de venir investir et transférer leur technologie en Irak pour une rémunération faible mais certaine de l’ordre de 1,5 à 2 dollars par baril produit. Dans un environnement du type « low risk – low reward » et sur des grands volumes, Bagdad pensait présenter une proposition attractive. Cependant ce type de contrats ne présentait guère d’intérêt pour les compagnies pétrolières. Les « majors » voyaient en ces contrats de services des inconvénients majeurs : (1) transférer leurs technologies et leur savoir-faire sans plus-value, (2) avoir à gérer d’importantes ressources humaines, des sous-traitants, des compagnies de services pour une rémunération faible et enfin et surtout (3) sans pouvoir – ou si peu – comptabiliser les réserves associées à ces contrats dans leurs actifs,  n’augmentant donc pratiquement pas la valeur de leur société. Les réponses aux appels d’offres du gouvernement irakien pour ce type de contrats n’ont pas suscité l’enthousiasme puisque le nombre de contrats pétroliers effectivement signés a toujours été bien en deçà de ce qui était initialement offert (Fig. 10), un certain nombre de ceux-ci ayant même dû être négocié en dehors de la procédure normale afin de trouver des terrains d’entente.

figure10

Sous-exploré, avec peu de réserves prouvées le Kurdistan doit favoriser les recherches s’il veut atteindre ses objectifs de développement. L’exploration pétrolière est une activité financièrement extrêmement risquée avec des probabilités de découvertes évoluant entre 10 et 20%. Investir l’argent public dans une activité d’exploration pour ensuite offrir – éventuellement – l’exploitation  des découvertes sous forme de contrats de services ne constitue pas (du moins pour le moment) une proposition viable. Afin d’attirer les capitaux des explorateurs, le KRG n’avait pas d’alternative et devait faire aux entreprises du secteur des propositions plus alléchantes sous forme de contrats de partage de production (PSC). La dynamique pouvait alors s’enclencher sur un mode «  high risk – high reward » : les entreprises misant leurs fonds sur de l’exploration et étant incitées à développer rapidement les infrastructures de production en cas de découverte afin d’engranger de substantiels profits. Les compagnies dites « d’exploration – production » sont gréées financièrement et humainement pour ce genre d’environnement et apprécient la reconnaissance de leur capacité à découvrir de nouveaux gisements. Le KRG n’a dans un premier temps attiré sur son territoire que de petites compagnies qui ne pouvaient prétendre jouer sur le terrain des grands champs irakiens, tandis que le gouvernement fédéral qualifiait ces contrats d’illégaux.  Depuis 2007 pourtant, le KRG a octroyé des permis à de grandes entreprises, jusqu’à attirer ces deux dernières années des « majors » déjà présentes dans le sud irakien (ExxonMobil, Total), malgré les menaces proférées à leur encontre par les autorités fédérales. En 2013, après de longues hésitations, Statoil  semble avoir renoncé à venir s’ajouter à la liste des compagnies privées bénéficiant de PSC  de la part du KRG (Fig. 11) et qui comptent début 2014 plus de quarante membres. Ces mouvements en direction de la province kurde révèlent aussi une confiance accrue des investisseurs dans la capacité du KRG à assurer un environnement stable. Les investissements dans le secteur se chiffrant rapidement en centaines de millions voire en milliards de dollars, on comprend que des assurances en matière de sureté des personnes et des biens d’une part, et de sécurisation des investissements d’autre part, sont fondamentales au développement des affaires. Le KRG, aussi bien dans la mise sur le terrain d’une force militaire et policière omniprésente, que dans sa communication, s’évertue à présenter le Kurdistan irakien comme la région la mieux contrôlée d’Irak, voire la plus sûre de toute la zone géographique.

figure 11

 L’export, point névralgique de l’exploitation et espoirs d’autonomie accrue pour le  KRG

Etant donnée la relative faiblesse de l’industrie pétrolière Kurde, la question de l’exportation des hydrocarbures n’en est qu’à ses balbutiements ; Les raffineries locales et le transport par camion vers des points d’entrée du réseau de pipelines comme à Kurmalah, suffisent à absorber la production de la région.  Toutefois, au regard des ambitions affichées, le KRG doit dès maintenant sécuriser les moyens d’acheminement d’une production amenée à décupler sur la décennie à venir.  La figure 12 montre l’état du réseau de pipeline, actuellement entièrement contrôlé par le gouvernement de Bagdad. Les exportations kurdes par ce réseau font régulièrement l’objet de disputes et les paiements entre les parties sont des sources intarissables de conflits.  Le KRG a donc décidé de confier à l’entreprise kurde KAR l’étude et la construction d’un pipeline reliant directement la région semi-autonome à la Turquie, sans que Bagdad n’y puisse exercer aucun contrôle. Cette ligne d’export devrait être mise en service en 2014. Au vu de la colère soulevée à Bagdad lors de l’annonce en 2013 par le KRG de la livraison de cargaisons de brut par camion directement à la Turquie on peut anticiper une crise majeure dans la région à l’approche de la mise en service de ce nouveau pipeline.

figure12

Au-delà du pétrole

Dans ce qui précède, nous avons brossé un tableau des enjeux pétroliers en nous concentrant tout d’abord sur l’importance du Moyen-Orient puis en analysant les ambitions affichées de l’Irak dans le secteur. En nous concentrant sur la situation interne de l’Irak et sur les différents pétroliers entre Bagdad et Irbil nous avons omis de décrire un contexte géopolitique et stratégique qui va bien au-delà du secteur qui nous occupe mais qui revêt une importance considérable.

Le peuple Kurde établi dans toute la région est fort d’environ 35 millions d’individus, dont la plus grosse portion (39%) réside en Turquie, l’Irak n’abritant que 12% de la nation kurde (Fig. 13) et qui constitue 13% du peuplement irakien. Bien au-delà du Kurdistan irakien, les kurdes revendiquent un territoire vaste de la Turquie mais aussi débordant largement sur l’Iran et dans une moindre mesure sur la Syrie (Fig. 14). Un Kurdistan à l’autonomie accrue et riche de ressources naturelles aura nécessairement un impact grandissant sur la stabilité politique de la région. Toutefois, le Kurdistan, qu’elles que soient ses frontières demeure un territoire enclavé. Le développement de ce territoire ne pourra avoir lieu que si les autorités parviennent à tisser des relations de bon voisinage avec les peuples qui l’entourent (Collier P., 2007). Nous l’avons vu, la question de l’export du pétrole du Kurdistan, pose déjà, au-delà des questions de souveraineté, celle des relations de voisinage. Entre la Syrie déchirée, l’Iran sanctionné et les rivalités avec le reste de l’Irak, le KRG a apparemment choisi de tisser des liens privilégiés avec la Turquie. Les entreprises turques sont présentes dans le pétrole, mais aussi dans la construction et le génie civil. Les turcs ont largement contribué à la construction de l’impressionnant aéroport d’Irbil. Des compagnies aériennes turques offrent des liaisons quotidiennes d’Istanbul et Ankara avec Irbil. Les relations entre le KRG et Ankara semblent au beau fixe, malgré la persistance de la question kurde en Turquie.

figure13

Mais si le Kurdistan a besoin de ses voisins, ces derniers ont aussi besoin du Kurdistan. Pays de montagne, situé sur les sources des bassins du Tigre et de l’Euphrate, Le Kurdistan est le château d’eau qui alimente les régions plus arides de l’Irak (Fig. 15). Avec 13 barrages et d’autres projets en cours, la Turquie (et dans une moindre mesure la Syrie) détient une des clés du développement : l’eau douce. Les nappes phréatiques qu’on allait naguère chercher à 80m sous terre, sont aujourd’hui pompées à 300m environ. Les puits les moins profonds se tarissent et des mesures drastiques de rationnement d’eau sont mises en place dans les agglomérations.

figure14

Après avoir longuement évoqué les questions pétrolières, il nous paraissait utile de remettre les choses en perspective et de rappeler que le sujet de l’approvisionnement, de l’utilisation et de la répartition des ressources en eau constitue très certainement le problème numéro un de la zone et la source la plus probable des conflits à venir.

figure15

 

                                                                                                                       

FREDERIC GUINOT

 
 
 
 
 
 
Réferences :     BP, Statistical review of world energy 2012, disponible sur le site www.bp.com
 
BMI, Business Monitor International, Iraq Oil and Gas Report, Q4 2012, ISSN 1748-4030
 
Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion , New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 224.